Data to follow

If asked to pinpoint the beginning of the war against Islamic extremism, most would probably say September 11, 2001. However, there has been tension between Islamic autocracies and Western governments going back centuries. In the early 1980s, the boogieman du jour was Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi, who sponsored numerous acts of terrorism throughout Europe. After a series of attacks resulted in the deaths of Americans, U.S. President Ronald Reagan elected to strike back.

Operation Eldorado Canyon is usually remembered as a long-range mission by British-based F-111s. However, it was an amazingly complex mission that involved two Navy aircraft carriers and a unique air refueling plan that involved more than half of the then new KC-10 tanker inventory. For the first time, the events leading up to this operation are described, including previously unrevealed contingency operations, missions testing the ability of the F-111s to fly such an extended mission, and the mission itself from the crews that flew it.

The USAF classified ‘forever’ the names of the F-111 crews who participated in the mission. After a 20-year reunion of the participants at RAF Lakenheath, one of the planners, Jim Rotramel, began collecting their recollections. He was later able to expand the story to include the KC-10 part of the mission. Finally, thanks to being a member of the informal Old Geezer Fighter Pilots, he made contact with the Navy veterans who participated in not only Eldorado Canyon, but also Operation Prairie Fire the month before that saw the first combat employment of the Harpoon anti-ship missile.

Like any post-mission fighter pilot debrief, this book lays out the conduct of the mission—the good, the bad, the ugly and even the humorous! It’s a truly unique insight into what it was like to plan and execute this daring mission and how it could have ended as a humiliating disaster at several points.

In September 2022, Chinese media outlets posted a brief news report mentioning the transformation of China’s naval aviation from a shore-based service to ship-based one. Therefore, the initial aim of this report was to describe this process and the transfer of individual units. 

By mid-2023, it was obvious that the PLAN retained control over its carrier-based aviation units, special missions units as well as helicop­ter and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) units, in addition to naval aviation training units, headquarters aviation elements and selected airfield stations.

Once it became clear that several units had already been handed-over and integrated into the existing PLAAF command struc­ture, the focus of this report shifted slightly from purely describing this process to including a comparison of the Orbats from before and during this reform. This was in order to investigate a likely scenario for the coming years as well as discuss some of the consequences and how these might transform both the remaining PLAN Naval Aviation and the PLAAF. 

Ultimately, it is clear that this most recent reform is merely another intermediate step towards a true ‘Blue-Water Navy’; a move that  will still require a lot of time to finalise.

This publication also includes a thorough investigation of the new system of H numbers in use with the PLAN, complete with what is currently known by autumn 2025 about the seven-digit system.
 

This publication details the production of aircraft, helicopters and air weapons in the Russian Federation for its war needs. In 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence received about 2.5 times more tactical combat aircraft than in 2021. The pace of production of combat helicopters has similarly increased.

Air weapons and UAVs have become ever more important, with the priority given to low-cost systems. New products were developed specifically for the needs of the war with Ukraine, including UMPK wing kits for general-purpose bombs, which are now in production at a rate of 3,500 per month. An unusual situation saw the purchase of Shahed one-way attack UAVs from Iran. Production of these was then launched in Russia (as the Geran) as a low-cost alternative to strategic cruise missiles.

A strategic issue for Russia’s aviation industry is the progressive loss of competence, which began long before the war. It is increasingly doubtful that Russia will be able to create next-generation products and the United Aircraft Corporation’s spending on R&D declined in 2024, indicating a reduction in new projects. New problems have arisen during the war, with Western embargoes on supplies to the Russian arms industry, leading the nation to launch ‘import substitution’ programmes, as well as ‘parallel imports’ (a euphemistic term for smuggling foreign-made components). A further issue is the lack of support for production tooling, which is almost all foreign, and the sudden increase in production has also caused personnel shortages.